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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEARL H. STEFFENSEN,
Plaintiff/Petitioner/CrossRespondent,

Case No. 910560

vs.
SMITHS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,

Priority No. 14

Defendant/Respondent/CrossPetitioner.

RESPONSE/REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER/CROSS-RESPONDENT

RESPONSE TO SMITH'S OPENING BRIEF
Inasmuch as both sides1 petitions for certiorari were
granted, this brief includes Mrs. Steffensen's response to the
issue raised by Smith's and a reply to Smith's response to her
opening brief.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(a) (1992) which grants the Utah Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the Court
of Appeals."

Mrs. Steffensen's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

was granted on May 12, 1992.

1

ISSUES PRESENTED BY SMITH'S FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Smith's presents one issue for
review:
I.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that

Smith's owed a duty to Mrs, Steffensen?

Smith's Cross-Petition

for Certiorari at 2-4.
The issues presented by Mrs. Steffensen for consideration
are detailed in the Brief of Petitioner at 1-2.
In reviewing decisions of the Court of Appeals, this Court
accords the lower court's statement of law, statutory
interpretation, or legal conclusion no particular deference.
decision is reviewed for correctness.
P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991);

The

State v. Humphrey, 823

City of Monticello v. Christensen,

788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules pertinent
to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text of
this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Petitioner, Pearl H. Steffensen, an eighty-two
year old woman, was seriously injured while shopping at a Smith's
store located at 2100 South and 900 East in Salt Lake City, Utah
when a shoplifter, being pursued through the store by Smith's
employees, collided with her, knocking her to the floor.

2

(R.

1242 at 5-6). x
Mrs. Steffensen commenced this action against Smith's
alleging that Smith's negligence was the cause of her injuries.
Among other things, Mrs. Steffensen alleged that Smith's failed
to properly train its employees to deal with shoplifters; that
Smith's employees violated Smith's written policies before
apprehending Mr. Burnett by failing to deter him; and that
Smith's employees violated Smith's written policies by chasing
and attempting to stop Mr. Burnett after he ran from them.
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 485 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

After presentation of all the evidence, Smith's

counsel moved for a partial directed verdict on the grounds that
Smith's failure to adequately train its employees and to deter
Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not be the proximate cause of
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1216 at 2-6).
granted Smith's motion.

(R. 1216 at 7).

The trial judge

The jury found that

Smith's had acted negligently but that the negligence was not the
proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.

(R. 1198)

Mrs. Steffensen appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming:
(1) that the trial court improperly granted the partial directed
verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No.
1

All references are to the record page number.
All
transcripts and depositions are stamped with a record page number
on the opening page. Because of confusion in the denomination of
the transcripts (i.e. there are at least three transcripts labeled
"Vol. IV"), transcript citations are given as "R.
at
" where
the first number is the record page number of the transcript and
the second number is the page number within the transcript volume
e.g., R. 1243 at 50 denotes page 50 of the transcript volume
labeled as record page 1243.
3

32 which required the jury to find that Smith's employees must be
able to specifically predict Mr. Burnett's actions in order to
find that Smith's actions caused Mrs. Steffensen's injuries, and
(3) that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony
regarding Smith's training practices and the apportionment of
fault between Smith's and Mr. Burnett.

The Court of Appeals

issued an opinion affirming the trial court on October 29, 1991.
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court

committed error in granting the partial directed verdict.
P.2d at 489.

820

However, the Court of Appeals then applied a

harmless error analysis and held that the trial court's error was
harmless. 820 P.2d at 490. The Court of Appeals also held that
Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but that the error was harmless.
820 P.2d at 490.

Finally, the Court of Appeals held the

exclusion of expert testimony on employee training was harmless
error and that the exclusion of testimony on the apportionment of
fault was proper.

820 P.2d at 491. This Court granted Mrs.

Steffensen's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on May 12, 1992.

FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Petitioner at pages
5 through 8.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In response to the issues raised by Smith's in its Brief of
4

Cross-Petitioner, Mrs. Steffensen first argues that Smith's claim
that Mrs. Steffensen did not establish a prima facie case is not
properly before the Court.

The issue was not raised in Smith's

Petition for Certiorari and therefore, should not be considered
by the Court.
Even if the Court considers Smith's claim, the evidence
presented by Mrs. Steffensen did establish a prima facie case.
The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence was presented
and that the trial court's directed verdict was erroneous.
Smith's presents nothing which contradicts those holdings.
Finally, Smith's claim that it owed no duty to Mrs.
Steffensen to protect her from the acts of others is meritless.
The Court of Appeals held that Smith's owed Mrs. Steffensen a
duty and the facts and case law substantiate that holding.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE TRIAL
COURT IMPROPERLY DIRECTED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
SMITHS.
In its cross-appeal, Smith's claims that the Court of
Appeals improperly held that the trial court erroneously directed
a verdict.

In advancing this claim, Smith's argues that (1) the

evidence did not establish a prima facie case and (2) Smith's
owed no duty to Mrs. Steffensen.

However, one of Smith's

arguments is not properly before the Court.

Furthermore, Smith's

ignores the facts of the case, the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, and substantial case law in making its arguments.
5

A.

SMITH'S ARGUMENT THAT MRS. STEFFENSEN DID NOT ESTABLISH
A PRIMA FACIE CASE WAS NOT RAISED IN SMITH'S PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI AND THEREFORE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE
COURT

Cross-Petitioner Smith's claims, "The trial court properly
directed a verdict to exclude evidence of actions prior to the
point at which Smithfs had a duty to protect Mrs. Steffensen from
the acts of the shoplifter.

The court of appeals1 determination

that the directed verdict was improper was erroneous."
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 4.

Brief of

Smith's then asserts that Mrs.

Steffensen's evidence did not establish a prima facie case
sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict.
of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 6, 8-9.

Brief

However, this portion

of Smith's claim is not properly before the Court.
Rule 49 (a) (4) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which governs petitions for certiorari, provides that:

"[o]nly

the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included
therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."

Smith's Cross-

Petition for Certiorari sets forth only one issue for this Court
to review, to wit:

Did Smith's owe a duty to protect Mrs.

Steffensen from the acts of a shoplifter prior to having
knowledge that a crime was being committed.
Petition for Certiorari at 2-4.

Smith's Cross-

While the issue presented under

the section "Questions Presented for Review" in Smith's CrossPetition for Certiorari is somewhat oblique and arguably includes
sufficiency of the prima facie case presented by Mrs. Steffensen,
the argument section of Smith's Cross-Petition concerns itself
exclusively with the question of whether Utah law imposes a duty
6

on Smith's to protect Mrs. Steffensen.2

Indeed, no mention is

made in the argument section of the cross-petition concerning the
sufficiency of the prima facie case.

Therefore, Mrs. Steffensen

contends that issue raised by Smith's concerning the sufficiency
of the prima facie case is not "fairly included" within Smith's
Cross-Petition for Certiorari so as to warrant consideration by
this Court.
B.

SMITHS CONTENTION THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY MRS.
STEFFENSEN DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE IS
MERITLESS.

Even if this Court addresses the improperly raised issue of
sufficiency of the prima facie case, the Court should find
Smith's argument to be without merit.
The trial court committed reversible error when it granted
its motion for a partial directed verdict.

The effect of the

trial court's ruling was to exclude much of the evidence already
presented at trial on the issue of proximate cause from the
jury's consideration.

Specifically, the jury was not allowed to

consider any act or omission on the part of Smith's prior to the
time Mr. Burnett was placed under arrest.
2

The question posed by Smith's in "Questions Presented for
Review" is:
Did the court of appeals erroneously
determine that the trial court had erred in
partially directing verdict as to activities
of Smith's prior to the time it knew Mr.
Burnett was committing a crime and apprehended
him?
Cross Petition for Certiorari at 1. Despite the phrasing of the
question, the argument presented by Smith's focuses exclusively on
the duty question.
7

In making its ruling, the trial court failed to recognize
that the evidence was such that reasonable jurors could have
arrived at a verdict in favor of Mrs. Steffensen.

Additionally,

the trial court failed to consider the evidence in its proper
light.

Finally, the trial court improperly weighed the evidence

when it made its ruling on Smith's motion for a directed verdict.
The trial court made a factual finding that Smith's conduct prior
to Mr. Burnett's apprehension was not the proximate cause of Mrs.
Steffensen's injuries.

However, proximate cause is generally an

issue of fact to be determined by the jury.

Therefore, as the

Court of Appeals found, the trial court's direction of a verdict
in favor of Smith's was erroneous.
A directed verdict is only appropriate when a trial court is
able to conclude that reasonable minds would not differ on the
facts from the evidence presented.3
3

Management Comm. v.

In its brief, Smith's argues that the party against whom
a motion for a directed verdict is made is required to show on
appeal that it established a prima facie case in the trial court.
Brief of Respondent at 6. In fact, the law in Utah as to the
amount of evidence required to withstand a motion for a directed
verdict in unclear. Smith's cites Highland Construction Co. v.
Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984), in support
of its contention that an appellant must first demonstrate that he
established a prima facie case in the trial court.
In fact,
Highland Construction cites Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah
1983), to support the proposition "We will view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was
directed, in order to determine whether Highland had established a
prima facie case." 683 P.2d at 1045. However, in Cruz, this Court
stated that "unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of
reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the
plaintiff's claim, a court should not direct the verdict for the
defendant." 660 P.2d at 729. (emphasis added) This quotation from
Cruz seems to indicate that evidence less than that necessary to
establish a prima facie case will be sufficient to withstand the
challenge of a motion for a directed verdict and approaches the

8

Grevstone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982).

In

making this determination, the court is required to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against the
directed verdict is sought.
1980).

Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah

An appellate court must apply the same standard as the

trial court when reviewing a directed verdict.
652 P.2d at 898.

Management Comm.,

Furthermore, this Court has stated that a trial

court is prohibited from considering the weight of the evidence
in passing on a motion for a directed verdict.

Cerritos Trucking

Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982).

If an

appellate court finds that there was a reasonable basis in the
evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom that would allow
reasonable minds to differ on the facts determined from the
evidence and that would support a verdict in favor of the losing
party, "the directed verdict cannot be sustained."
Comm., 652 P.2d at

Management

898.

In this case, Smith's argues that Mrs. Steffensen's evidence

"scintilla of the evidence" rule which some jurisdictions apply in
determining a motion for directed verdict.
However, Highland
Construction also cites Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419,
497 P.2d 28 (1972).
In Lindsay, this Court stated that the
plaintiff must present sufficient evidence "to establish a prima
facie case against the defendant in order to have his cause
submitted for consideration by the jury.11 497 P.2d at 30. However,
Lindsay cites no authority for this proposition. Because of this
dichotomy in the cases, the amount of evidence required to be
presented by a plaintiff in order to withstand a motion for a
directed verdict is unclear and depends entirely upon which case a
party chooses to cite. However, in this case, the issue is moot
because the Court of Appeals applied a prima facie evidence test in
evaluating whether or not Mrs. Steffensen had presented sufficient
evidence to withstand a motion for a directed verdict. Steffensen,
820 P.2d at 486.
9

did not establish a prima facie case.
9.

Brief of Respondent at 6-

However, in making this claim, Smith's ignores the standard

applied by the Court of Appeals and the facts recited by the
Court of Appeals which it found did establish that Mrs.
Steffensen had presented a prima facie case.
The Court of Appeals applied a prima facie case standard in
its of review of this case.

Steffensen. 820 P.2d at 486.

The

Court of Appeals then delineated the evidence presented by Mrs.
Steffensen which showed that Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett
could have been viewed by a reasonable juror as the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.

The Court of Appeals

stated:
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a
matter of law, that Mr. Burnett's acts
following apprehension broke the chain of
causation between Smith's failure to deter
Mr. Burnett and Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
Substantial evidence before the jury
indicated that Smith's could have reasonably
foreseen that the customer would be injured
by a shoplifter's decision to run,
particularly when, instead of deterring the
shoplifter, Smith's chose to "play cat and
mouse." Certainly Mrs. Steffensen presented
evidence on this theory of causation. A
closer question is whether any reasonable
juror could conclude that the evidence and
all reasonable inferences drawn from it shows
Smith's failure to deter it was a
contributing cause of Mrs. Steffensen's
injury.
In this case, Mrs. Steffensen introduced
substantial expert testimony that, in dealing
with shoplifters, deterrence measures prevent
shoplifting and thus promote customer safety.
During trial, Mrs. Steffensen presented
testimony from security and shoplifting
experts who testified that Smith's employees
failed to use reasonable means to handle Mr.
10

Burnett, a suspected shoplifter, sufficient
to protect the safety of the store's
customers. These experts identified two
specific and generally accepted techniques
that retail stores employ when dealing with
shoplifters and which Smith's failed to
implement. First, the experts testified that
a retail store could take steps to "deter" a
suspected shoplifter from carrying out his or
her plan by taking such affirmative action as
making direct eye contact with the suspected
shoplifter, approaching the suspected
shoplifter and offering assistance, and
calling for security over the public intercom
system. Second, the experts testified that a
retail store should also train its employees
to use care when apprehending a shoplifter.
The experts agreed that employees should not
chase or use force with a shoplifter who
becomes violent or flees. These experts
testified that stores employ, or should
employ, such techniques primarily to protect
the safety of their customers and to prevent
incidents precisely like the one which
occurred in this case. In addition, Mrs.
Steffensen submitted copies of Smith's
employee training manuals which advocated
deterrence in dealing with shoplifters. Mr.
Burnett was, in fact, deterred when he
thought Smith's employees were watching while
he was in the store. He went to get in the
check-out line and waited there until he
believed he was not being watched. Further,
Mrs. Steffensen's experts testified that
approximately 5% of all shoplifters, when
apprehended, run. They likewise testified
that the proper use of deterrence techniques
can reduce this number by reducing the number
of shoplifters as a whole.
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 488-489.

The court also cited evidence

from Smith's experts which indicated that deterrence and
refraining from using force or chasing a shoplifter are valid
security methods.

820 P.2d at 489, n. 3.

Finally, the Court of

Appeals cited sections from Smith's employee manuals which
contained statements advocating the use of deterrence techniques
11

in handling shoplifters and instructed employees on the
importance of customer safety in handling shoplifters.

820 P.2d

at 489, n. 4.
This evidence led the Court of Appeals to conclude that, as
a matter of law, the trial court's ruling that Smith's failure to
deter Mr. Burnett could have been a contributing proximate cause
of Mrs. Steffensen's injury.

The court concluded: "[t]here was

probably sufficient evidence produced from which a reasonable
juror could infer that Smith's failure to deter was a negligent
act, as it would have been reasonably foreseeable to an
adequately trained employee that his or her decision to apprehend
the shoplifter in a crowded store could have led to a customer's
injury."

820 P.2d at 489.

Smith's ignores all of this evidence when it makes its claim
that Mrs. Steffensen did not present a prima facie case.
Furthermore, Smith's totally disregards the standard of review in
both the trial and appellate courts which requires that any
inferences from the evidence should be viewed in a light most
favorable to the party being moved against.

Clearly, the issue

should have been presented to the jury as the Court of Appeals
correctly concluded.

The Court of Appeals stated:

In sum, the issue of proximate cause
should be taken from the jury only where:
(1) there is no evidence to establish a
causal connection, thus leaving causation to
jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable
persons could not differ on the inferences to
be derived from the evidence on proximate
causation.
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 487 (citation omitted).
12

Here, the

evidence was sufficient to establish a causal connection and, as
the Court of Appeals found, reasonable persons could have
differed on the inferences to be derived from the evidence and
proximate cause.

Therefore, despite Smith's argument to the

contrary, the issue should have gone to the jury and the trial
court erred in removing it from jury consideration.
C.

CONTRARY TO ITS CLAIM, SMITH'S OWED A DUTY TO MRS.
STEFFENSEN AS THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD.

Smith's argues that it owed no duty to Mrs. Steffensen to
protect her from the acts of Mr. Burnett prior to having
knowledge that a crime was being committed.
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 7-8.

Brief of

In making this argument,

Smith's ignores the clear language of the opinion of the Court of
Appeals.

The Court of Appeals stated, "We recognize the trial

judge's decision in finding Smith's owed Mrs. Steffensen a duty
to take reasonable precautions to protect her from the criminal
acts of third parties was correct."

820 P.2d at 489, n. 5.

In support of its position, Smith cites Dwiggins v. Morgan's
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991).

Smith's argues that Dwiqgins

stands for the notion that it owed Mrs. Steffensen no duty
because Smith's had no reason to know that Burnett was engaged in
criminal activity.

However, Dwiggins, which involved injury to a

customer during the course of a robbery, is distinguishable from
this case.

In Dwiggins, the Court stated:

The acts alleged in this case fail to
establish the requisite level of
foreseeability. Morgan Jewelers did not have
reason to know that the store was about to be
robbed. One robbery [of the store] five
13

years earlier is insufficient to make a
subsequent robbery foreseeable and therefore
does not give rise to a duty on the part of
Morgan Jewelers.
811 P.2d at 183 (footnote omitted).
Dwicrcrins does not foreclose merchant liability for the
criminal acts of third persons.

Dwiaains simply stands for the

proposition that a duty does not arise on the part of a merchant
until an event is sufficiently foreseeable by the merchant.

This

interpretation is supported by the fact that Dwiaains cites Taco
Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46-49 (Colo. 1987), in which
the Colorado Supreme Court held that ten armed robberies in three
years at the same Taco Bell restaurant made the likelihood of
injury to a customer during an armed robbery a foreseeable event.
The Colorado court therefore held that Taco Bell had a legal duty
to take measures to protect its customers.

744 P.2d at 49-50.

The Smith's store where Mrs. Steffensen was injured deals
with shoplifting incidents and arrests on a regular basis.

In

fact, Robert Gratten, a former security officer for Smith's,
testified that 2-3 shoplifting incidents per day occurred at the
store and that he witnessed incidents involving shoplifters at
the store being chased by store employees. (R. 1211 at 89, 93-94,
104)

He also testified that some of these chases resulted in

injuries.

(R. 1211 at 89-104)

Warren Cocke, one of Smith's

experts, verified the potential danger of shoplifting situations.
(R. 1247 at 520)

Mr. Cocke also testified that at least 5 out of

100 attempted arrests result in suspects running. (R. 1247 at
491)

Furthermore, Smith's employee manuals recognized the
14

potential for injury to customers caused by shoplifters.

One of

those manuals stated:
Our company policy is that no employee is to
take any action in the apprehension of a
shoplifter which will bring harm to himself,
to other employees, or to customers. The
most important thing to remember about
apprehending a shoplifter is that we do not
want anyone injured. There is nothing in the
store that is worth a person getting hurt
for. Use common sense, if the situation
can't be properly controlled let the
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license
number.
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 489, n. 4.

Smith's brief cites no

evidence which would indicate that it could not reasonably
foresee the events in this case.

Thus, any claim that Smith's

could not reasonably anticipate a shoplifter fleeing or a
customer getting hurt by the acts of a shoplifter is simply
unsupported by the evidence.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals cited the relevant
facts of this case and distinguished Dwiggins in holding that
Smith's owed a duty to Mrs. Steffensen.

Specifically, the Court

of Appeals stated:
Since trial, the Utah Supreme Court has
visited the issue of shop owner's duty to
protect customers from the criminal acts of
third parties. See Dwiggins v. Morgan's
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). In
Dwiggins. the Utah Supreme Court adopted
Section 344 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts,
stating land owners have a duty to business
invitees to take reasonable steps to protect
invitees from the criminal acts of third
parties where such acts are reasonably
foreseeable. The Dwiggins court held where a
jewelry store had only been robbed once in
ten years, a robbery is not foreseeable.
However, Dwiggins is distinguishable because
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the store in question was the most frequently
shoplifted store in the Smith's chain.
Further, the fact that Smith's employee
manuals advocate the safe handling of
shoplifters demonstrates Smith's did, in
fact, foresee such criminal acts. Therefore,
we believe the trial judge properly found
that the customer's injury from shoplifters
was foreseeable, the law imposed a duty on
Smith's to take reasonable measures to
protect its customers from injuries resulting
from dealing with shoplifters. See also Taco
Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46-49
(Colo. 1987) (Store owner had a duty to take
reasonable security measures to protect
customers where store had been the subject of
armed robbery ten times in past three years)
(relied on by Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 n.
1.).
820 P.2d at 489, n. 5.4
Smith's argument that it owed no duty to Mrs. Steffensen is
not supported by either the facts or the case law.

The Court of

Appeals correctly held that Smith's owed a duty to Mrs.
Steffensen and the trial court erroneously directed a verdict in
favor of Smith's.

4

The court's statement that the Smith's store in which
Mrs. Steffensen was injured "was the most frequently shoplifted
store in the Smith's chain" may not be entirely accurate. Robert
Gratten, a Smith's loss prevention officer who had worked at the
store in question, initially gave a statement in which he stated
the store was among the worst as far as frequency of shoplifting
with five to seven shoplifting incidents per day. (R. 1211 at 10203) At trial, Mr. Gratten testified that the store was not the
worst but rather "middle of the road." (R. 1211 at 103) However,
the two to three shoplifting incidents per day with two shoplifters
per week attempting to flee that Mr. Gratten testified to at trial
clearly put Smith's on notice of a serious problem with the
potentially disastrous consequences which were realized in this
case. (R. 1211 at 94, 104).
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REPLY TO SMITH'S RESPONSE TO MRS. STEFFENSEN1 S OPENING BRIEF
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In replying to Smithfs response to her opening brief, Mrs.
Steffensen argues that Smith's fails to cite any case in which an
appellate court of this state has held the granting of a directed
verdict to be erroneous, but has applied a harmless error
analysis to affirm the trial court.

The application of such

analysis is incompatible with the standard of review for a
directed verdict.
Mrs. Steffensen next contends one of the jury instructions
misstated the law of foreseeability.

Smith's argument to the

contrary ignores facts and case law.
Finally, Mrs. Steffensen asserts that the Court of Appeals
erred in upholding the trial court's exclusion of evidence.
Smith's has ignored recent case law in arguing in support of the
Court of Appeals' opinion.
POINT I
CONTRARY TO SMITH'S UNSUPPORTED ASSERTION, THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
GRANTED SMITH'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
In her opening brief, Mrs. Steffensen argues that when the
Court of Appeals applied a harmless error analysis after
determining that the trial court had erroneously granted a motion
for a partial directed verdict, the Court of Appeals decided an
important question of first impression in this state.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decided the question in a way
which conflicts with dozens of cases decided by this Court over a
17

substantial period of time.

Mrs. Steffensen noted that

ff

[a]

review of forty years of cases from the Utah Supreme Court
reveals that the Court has never held an erroneously granted
directed verdict to be harmless error.11

Brief of Petitioner at

13.
In response, Smithfs claims that the statistics provided in
Mrs. Steffensenfs brief do "not conclusively support her position
that harmless error analysis does not apply to directed
verdicts."

Furthermore, Smith1s cites two cases in which it

claims this Court has "applied harmless error analysis in appeals
of directed verdicts."

However, the cases cited by Smith's are

simply not applicable to this case.
Smith's first cites Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039
(Utah 1981), as an example of the application of a harmless error
analysis to a directed verdict by this Court.

In fact, a cursory

examination of Martineau reveals the differences between that
case and this one.
auto accident.

Martineau involved a claim arising from an

Following the presentation of evidence, the

plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the issue of liability.
636 P.2d at 1041.

The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion

and the case was submitted to the jury on general verdicts.

Id.

The jury eventually returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
but awarded only nominal damages.

The plaintiff alleged that the

trial court committed error by refusing to direct a verdict on
the liability issue.

This Court held, "Given the decision

reached by the jury, the Court's refusal to direct a verdict is a
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moot."

636 P.2d at 1041-42.

The Court then did say that because

the liability issue was decided in favor of the plaintiff, the
error in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
"is rendered harmless."

636 P.2d at 1042.

Martineau is plainly inapplicable to this case.

In that

case the trial court refused to direct a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, whereas in this case, the trial court granted a
verdict in favor of the defendant.5

Furthermore, because of the

outcome on the issues of liability and damages, the court held
that the trial court's refusal to grant the directed verdict was
"moot".

In contrast, in this case the Court of Appeals found the

trial court's direction of partial verdict in favor of the
defendant was erroneous.
Martineau

In short, Smith's fails to note that

was in an entirely different procedural posture than

this case.
Smith's also cites Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No.
i, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982), as a case in which it says the Utah
Supreme Court applied a harmless error analysis to a directed
verdict.

Once again, the procedural posture of the case

differentiates it from this case.

In Cerritos Trucking, after

both parties had presented their evidence, plaintiffs moved for
directed verdicts.

The trial court granted the plaintiff's

motions for directed verdicts and the defendant's counter-claims
5

In this regard Smith's fails to realize that the
statement made in Mrs. Steffensen's opening brief is that "a review
of forty years of cases from the Utah Supreme Court reveals that
the Court has never held an erroneously granted directed verdict to
be harmless error." (emphasis added).
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and cross-claims were dismissed.

The defendants appealed, urging

that the trial court's direction of verdicts was erroneous and
further that the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard to
the motions for directed verdict.

645 P.2d at 611.

The Court

held that "There was no basis upon which the defendants could
have prevailed on their claim and the directed verdict in favor
of the plaintiffs was properly granted.11

645 P.2d at 612. On

another of the plaintiff's motions for a directed verdict the
Court also found that defendant's claim was "groundless and the
court properly directed a verdict against him on that claim."
645 P.2d at 612.

The Supreme Court then applied a harmless error

analysis, not in the evaluation of the directed verdicts, but in
the determination of whether the trial judge applied the proper
standard in considering the weight of the evidence in granting
the motions for directed verdicts.

The Court concluded,

"Although in passing on a motion for directed verdict, it is not
proper for the trial judge to weigh evidence, that he did so in
this case did not result in prejudicial error since the
defendants were not entitled to success in any event."

645 P.2d

at 613.
Cerritos Trucking does not apply in this instance because in
that case the appellate court found that the directed verdicts
were properly granted.

In contrast, in this case, the Court of

Appeals found that the directed verdict was erroneously granted.
Smith's has failed to cite any case in which an appellate
court of this state has held the granting of a directed verdict
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to be erroneous, but has applied a harmless error analysis to
affirm the trial court.

As noted in Mrs. Steffensen's opening

brief, a harmless error analysis is inconsistent with an
appellate court's ruling that a directed ruling has been
erroneously granted.

Brief of Petitioner at 8-16.

Smith's also asserts that Mrs. Steffensen "must show that
the error [in the direction of a verdict] was prejudicial in that
it substantially affected the outcome of her case as it was
presented to the jury."

Brief of Respondent at 11. As argued in

Mrs. Steffensen's opening brief, that is simply not a correct
statement of the law.

If an appellate court finds that a verdict

was erroneously directed, it has found that reasonable minds
could differ on the facts and that a verdict in favor of the
losing party could be supported by the evidence.

Management

Comm. v. Greystone Pines, Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982).
In essence, the standard of appellate review carries a
presumption of prejudice.
However, even if Smith's assertion were a correct statement
of the law, Mrs. Steffensen's opening brief demonstrated the
likelihood of a more favorable outcome if all the issues had been
properly presented to the jury.

Brief of Petitioner at 16-18.

The Court of Appeals concluded that a different result was
likely, but for the trial court's error in directing a verdict.
Even though Smith's does not acknowledge it, the Court of Appeals
stated:
There was probably sufficient evidence
produced from which a reasonable juror could
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infer that Smith's failure to deter was a
negligent act, as it would have been
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately
training employee that his or her decision to
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store
could have led to a customer's injury.
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 489 (footnote omitted).

In effect, the

Court of Appeals found a reasonable juror could have found in
favor of Mrs. Steffensen.

Therefore, the error in directing the

verdict was prejudicial.
POINT II
CONTRARY TO SMITH»S CLAIMf JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 32 IS
INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW.
In her opening brief, Mrs. Steffensen claims that the trial
court incorrectly instructed the jury on the issue of
foreseeability.

The instruction given by the trial court stated:

Foreseeability in these instructions
means injury or harm, if any, to a customer
which the defendant and its employees could
have reasonably anticipated as the natural
consequences of their actions, if any, even
though they were not able to anticipate the
particular injury which did occur.
In determining what is foreseeable, you
must determine that the actions by Burnett
were predictable by Smith's employees and not
just a mere possibility.
(R.944).

The Court of Appeals agreed that the instruction was

erroneous because it improperly focused on the actions of the
specific shoplifter.

820 P.2d at 490.

However, the court

applied a harmless error analysis and concluded that the
instruction was harmless. 820 P.2d at 490.

Mrs. Steffensen

further argues in her opening brief that the Court of Appeals
effectively overruled Rees v. Albertson's, Inc. 587 P.2d 130, 133
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(Utah 1978), in its discussion of foreseeability.
In response, Smithfs argues that Instruction No. 32, which
Smith's characterizes as "unfortunate," is compatible with Rees.
Smith's then makes the amazing claim that the jury instruction
"did not ... force the jury to deal specifically with the actions
of a single shoplifter."

Brief of Respondent at 13.

In making

these arguments, Smith's ignores Rees and the plain language of
the jury instruction.
In Rees, this Court specifically stated:

"What is necessary

to meet the test of negligence and proximate cause is that it be
reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident would
occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of
the same general nature."

587 P.2d at 133 (Emphasis added).

The

Court not only linked negligence and proximate cause to
foreseeability, but it also stated that foreseeability was not
limited to the particular set of circumstances which occurred.
In essence, Rees forbids the instruction given in this case.
Smith's argument also ignores other authorities cited by Mrs.
Steffensen which state that "[F]oreseeability does not mean the
precise hazard or exact consequences ... should have been
foreseen."

Brief of Petitioner at 18-22.

Finally, Smith's assertion that the instruction "did not ...
force the jury to deal specifically with the actions of a single
shoplifter" is belied by the instruction itself.

The instruction

requires that in considering foreseeability, the jury "must
determine that the actions by Burnett were predictable by Smith's
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employees".

The Court of Appeals agreed "that the specific

identity of the shoplifter is irrelevant to the question of
foreseeability."

Steffensen 820 P.2d at 490.

The instruction at

issue here constrained the jury to find that the specific
shoplifter's actions were foreseeable before it could find in
favor of Mrs. Steffensen.

When this instruction was coupled with

the trial court's erroneously directed verdict, the jury was
forced to find that Smith's did not proximately cause Mrs.
Steffensen's injuries.
POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED THE UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE AND IGNORED UTAH SUPREME COURT CASE LAW IN
UPHOLDING THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE.
In her opening brief, Mrs. Steffensen argues that the Court
of Appeals erroneously upheld the trial court's exclusion of
testimony from her expert regarding the involvement of Smith's
security administrators in the training of employees in the
handling and deterrence of shoplifters.

Mrs. Steffensen further

asserts thett the Court of Appeals' holding that the trial court's
exclusion of evidence with respect to the apportionment of fault
as an invasion of the province of the jury was incorrect and
incompatible with the Rules of Evidence and Utah case law. Mrs.
Steffensen also argues that the Court of Appeals' ruling that the
exclusion of evidence on Smith's training procedures was harmless
error was erroneous.

Brief of Petitioner at 22-26.

In response, Smith's argues that "even if the testimony
about the training program were relevant, it would serve no
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purpose and was likely to confuse the jury and distract them from
the core issues of the case.11

Brief of Respondent at 15.

Without citing the most recent case issued by the Utah Supreme
Court, Smith's argues that the trial court's ruling on the issue
of apportionment was proper.

Finally, Smith's argues that Mrs.

Steffensen has failed to demonstrate prejudice which would
justify reversal of the trial court's evidentiary decisions.
Smith's position ignores the facts of this case and case law from
this Court.
As pointed out in Mrs. Steffensen's opening brief, the
expert's testimony regarding Smith's improper training methods
was relevant because it would have demonstrated a causal link
between the training and monitoring of shoplifting cases and the
incident in this case.

The expert would have testified that if

proper training and monitoring procedures had been followed, the
incident in this case would not have occurred.

The expert's

testimony would have demonstrated that Smith's negligence in its
training procedures was the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's
injuries.

Brief of Petitioner at 24.

With respect to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the
expert's testimony regarding the apportionment of fault between
Smith's and Burnett would have invaded the province of the jury,
Smith's cites cases decided under the former rules of evidence.
Brief of Respondent at 16.

However, Smith's does not cite the

most recent pronouncement from this Court on the issue of the
admissibility of legal conclusions.
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In that case, State v. Span,

819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991), this Court gave a very broad
interpretation to Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The

Court statcad that the only limitation imposed by Rule 704 was
that the expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
n.l.

819 P.2d at 332,

When this standard of admissibility is applied to the

expert's testimony in this case, the inescapable conclusion is
that the evidence should have been admitted.

Accordingly, the

holding of the Court of Appeals was erroneous.
With respect to Smith's assertion that the erroneous
exclusion of evidence was not prejudicial, Mrs. Steffensen argues
that the exclusion of evidence was inextricably related to the
other issues presented by this appeal.

The trial court excluded

relevant evidence of proximate cause and apportionment of fault
and then justified the erroneous direction of a verdict and an
erroneous jury instruction based on the lack of evidence.

If all

of the evidence had been heard, the trial court could have
justified neither the direction of the verdict nor Jury
Instruction No. 32.
CONCLUSION
Smith's ignores the facts of this case and case law in
claiming that the Court of Appeals was wrong when it held that
the trial court erroneously directed a verdict against Mrs.
Steffensen.

That portion of the Court of Appeals decision should

be affirmed.
Smith's has failed to cite any case in which an appellate
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court of this state has held the granting of a directed verdict
to be erroneous, but has applied a harmless error analysis to
uphold the trial court.

The Court of Appeals' application of a

harmless error analysis in this case is simply incompatible with
the standard of review to be applied by an appellate court to a
directed verdict.
inconsistency.

Smith's does not even address this

Smith's admits that Jury Instruction No. 32 was

"unfortunate" but ignores case law from this state and other
authorities which demonstrate the clear error and prejudice
caused by the jury instruction.

Finally, Smith's fails to deal

with the most recent case from this jurisdiction regarding the
Court of Appeals' erroneous ruling on the trial court's exclusion
of significant evidence.
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
Court of Appeals should be reversed, except as noted above, and
the case remanded for a new trial.
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